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Massimo Comparini is the Managing Director of the Space Division at Leonardo.

QPS Laboratory, based in Chuo-ku, Fukuoka City, develops small SAR satellites.

QPS-SAR satellites support a normal stripmap mode with 1.8-meter resolution and a high-resolution spotlight mode with 0.46-meter resolution.

QPS-SAR No.15 "Sukunami-I" was launched on December 21, 2025 on Rocket Lab’s Electron rocket.

QPS-SAR No.15 deployed its stowable antenna on the morning following launch.

QPS Laboratory released high-resolution images from QPS-SAR No.15 that show Oyamazaki Town in Kyoto Prefecture, Kanazawa City in Ishikawa Prefecture, and Istanbul, Turkey.

QPS-SAR No.15 successfully separated from its launch vehicle about 50 minutes after liftoff.

QPS-SAR continues in-orbit adjustment of its satellite instruments after launch.

QPS-SAR No.15 established initial contact six minutes after separation.

QPS Laboratory published the first-light test observation images from its small SAR satellite QPS-SAR No.15 "Sukunami-I" on January 23.

The International Telecommunication Union framework prohibits harmful interference and applies to radio-frequency forms of electronic interference against satellites.

Non-kinetic ASAT attacks typically leave no debris, can be reversible, and are more difficult to attribute than kinetic ASAT attacks.

The law of armed conflict provides rules such as proportionality, distinction, and necessity but applies only in situations of armed conflict and therefore excludes most non-kinetic ASATs occurring in peacetime strategic competition.

Kinetic antisatellite (ASAT) systems physically destroy satellites and create long-lasting orbital debris.

Customary international law principles such as state responsibility and due diligence could, in theory, apply to non-kinetic ASAT operations but there is a conspicuous absence of effective state practice accepting responsibility for soft-kill interference.

Proposed measures to address non-kinetic ASAT threats include sharing more data on satellite locations, updating rules on the sale of sensitive space technologies, and creating joint mechanisms to investigate satellite attacks.

The Woomera Manual and related reports restate that existing international law, particularly the law of armed conflict and use of force, applies to space operations without creating new binding law.

Non-kinetic ASAT weapons include high-powered directed energy weapons, electronic warfare systems that jam or spoof communications, and cyberattacks that corrupt satellite software or data links.

India conducted the 2019 Mission Shakti ASAT test, which destroyed a satellite and created orbital debris.

China conducted a direct-ascent ASAT missile strike on one of its own satellites in 2007 that generated large amounts of space debris.

The Viasat KA-SAT satellite network suffered a cyberattack in February 2022 that caused widespread disruptions across Europe.

Russia interfered with the Starlink satellite internet service in Ukraine during the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The United Nations established an Open-Ended Working Group on Reducing Space Threats through Norms, Rules and Principles of Responsible Behavior to address space threats including non-kinetic capabilities.

Article III of the Outer Space Treaty incorporates the UN Charter into space activities, making the Charter's law on use of force applicable to outer space.

North Korea conducted GPS jamming operations against South Korea in 2024 that interfered with civil aviation and maritime navigation.

Russia jammed GPS signals used by civilian aircraft during the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

The Secure World Foundation’s Global Counterspace Capabilities assessments provide a public catalogue that indicates most contemporary operational counterspace activity is non-destructive and reversible.

The UN General Assembly adopted a resolution targeting destructive direct-ascent ASAT testing, reflecting political aversion to debris-creating kinetic tests while leaving non-kinetic measures largely unaddressed.

The International Telecommunication Union lacks a coercive enforcement mechanism and does not possess an investigative arm for attributing radio-frequency interference.

The Outer Space Treaty (OST) Article IX requires that states conduct activities in outer space with an expectation to avoid harmful interference with the activities of other states in outer space.

KSAT’s operational ambition is to reduce space-based information delivery latency to below five minutes by 2030 regardless of operator, orbit, or platform.

The Vake platform combines KSAT’s global ground station network with advanced artificial intelligence to provide persistent monitoring of high-traffic and remote maritime zones.

The Vake system is designed to automatically adjust collection parameters based on feature detections, such as vessel signatures that do not correlate with known AIS data.

The Vake platform uses an internalized value chain spanning tasking, collection, and processing to allow dynamic rescheduling of satellite assets during contingency events.

Kongsberg Satellite Services launched Vake Powered by KSAT, a consolidated maritime situational awareness platform designed to detect, identify, and track non-cooperative or dark vessels.

The Vake roadmap includes further reducing data latency and expanding the diversity of integrated data sources as satellite constellations proliferate.

The Vake system leverages a historical database and AI trained in collaboration with European navies and coast guards to autonomously highlight anomalies within a specific area of interest.

The Vake platform incorporates tipping-and-cueing capability to enable near-real-time responses by maritime authorities as KSAT pursues its 2030 five-minute delivery target.

Vake provides a unified portal for data compilation and the ability to task new satellite collections on-demand to simplify space-based data access for end users.

Vake Powered by KSAT integrates optical, radio frequency, and synthetic aperture radar data from 15 different satellite providers into a single operational interface.

Vake is designed to address limitations of the Automatic Identification System by detecting vessels that have deactivated or spoofed AIS.

KSAT acquired a majority stake in VAKE, a Norwegian startup specializing in machine learning for maritime domain awareness, in March 2024.

KSAT delivers 15-minute collection-to-dissemination timelines across satellite operators through its integrated value chain.

Blue Origin will reuse a first-stage booster recovered from a previous flight on the New Glenn NG-3 mission.

Blue Origin is upgrading New Glenn's engines and plans to introduce those upgrades starting with NG-3.

Blue Origin became the second company, after SpaceX, to recover a first stage from an orbital launch.

Rakuten Mobile plans to provide communications services in Japan using BlueBird satellites beginning in autumn 2026.

The NG-3 launch is scheduled for late February 2026 or later.

New Glenn mission NG-3 will carry AST SpaceMobile's Block 2 BlueBird communications satellite to low Earth orbit.